While the most over-reported story (and the most debunked) story in the press this past August was the drafting of and the opposition to the Iraqi constitution, the most under-reported story in September is how ongoing negotiations have moderated large portions of the document’s opposition. In fact, as some of the contentious issues have been negotiated down, and the document has circulated amongst the general population, its approval and acceptance has become more likely. While we can’t perfectly predict what will happen, major leaders on the playing field are saying that they will not mount strong campaigns against the constitution, and will focus instead on the December elections.

BAGHDAD, Iraq - The two strongest opponents of Iraq’s proposed new constitution said this week that they wouldn’t campaign against it aggressively, making it likely that voters will approve the constitution in an Oct. 15 referendum.

Passage would be a victory for the Bush administration’s Iraq policy, but it’s unclear whether the document will produce a stable Iraqi government with broad public support or further alienate the country’s Sunni Muslim Arab minority.

Rebel Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s representatives said that while he’s not thrilled about the constitution, he likely wouldn’t encourage his followers to oppose it.

Hazem al-Araji, a senior al-Sadr aide, said that al-Sadr has formed a committee to review the document and that once he hears from them he’ll make a final decision.

“But for now, his opinion is neutral,” al-Araji said.

The largest Sunni political group, the Iraqi Islamic Party, said that although it has encouraged its supporters to vote down the document, its efforts are focused on the December election for a new National Assembly.

“There are powers that will make sure this bad constitution passes,” said Ala’a al-Maki, a party spokesman. “We are focusing more on ensuring the Sunnis participate in the next election.”

Both al-Sadr’s supporters and members of the Islamic Party said they’re concerned that federalist provisions in the constitution could divide the country along sectarian lines.

What’s interesting also is the large disconnect between Iraqis themselves and the leaders that they elected. The National Assmembly elections last January were a brilliant moment in Iraqi history, but the fact is, there were so many random parties and candidates that nobody really knew who to vote for, so many Shia voted for the religious parties that were endorsed. Also, the dramatic Sunni leaders currently in the assembly weren’t elected due to the Sunni boycott, but were actually selected to be in the assembly as an olive branch effort.

After watching these people wrangle over issues like Islam in the constitution and turning the south into an area controlled by religious militias affiliated with the major political parties, people are taking notice of the way these people rule and aren’t liking it. The constitution is actually pretty good now, and now that it is being read widely by the population, people aren’t as up in arms about it as they used to be, when they only knew what their leaders told them.

Since it will be likely approved, the shaping up of the December elections is even more interesting now than the October referendum. If you take into account what I just wrote, people are beginning to opt for good governance over religious ideology in government. This attitude, combined with high Sunni turnout, will lead to a huge drop in the representation of religious parties. Here is what I predicted a while back.

So why the rush to make decisions on these issues? Why not leave it up to future parliaments to negotiate in order to avoid a ???????no??????? setback? Because come the parliamentary election in December, the gap will likely be closed by a large margin, meaning that religious parties will lose seats as the public has learned what they represent. And they don????????t want it. Also, the Sunnis won????????t be boycotting, which will give them a larger representation to fuel direct opposition to sectarian federalism.

Now, it appears that secular parties are rising to the top, while religious parties are beginning to wilt. Omar talks about the fracture developing in the current leadership, as names somewhat forgotten like former prime minister Allawi are becoming prominent again.

Election wise, parties and candidates are working fast to prepare themselves for the next competition by forming alliances and gathering public support, so far the IECI announced the registration of 42 political bodies that will be competing in December (the number was 111 in the January elections) and this attributed to more and more parties joining efforts to form bigger alliances to increase their chances of winning seats in the parliament especially that it is expected to need over 40,000 votes to win a single seat compared with 30,000 more or less last January since most signals indicate a higher turnout this time.

Among the most prominent emerging alliances is that of former PM Allawi who’s most likely going to enter the elections as a major player and probably could win more seats than what the two major blocs did last time. Allawi is inviting everyone to join him and he’s getting some good responses from other parties; the most significant addition was made by the major Sunni party, the Islamic Party which joined Allawi last week.

While this is happening, there are news that the Sheat alliance is suffering from serious divisions among its major components, namely observers expect Chalabi and vice president Aadil Abdulmahdi to depart the team and form their own secular-Sheat alliance.

What we’re essentially seeing in Iraq is the formation of large political parties based on moreso on political than ethnic or religious differences. It’s just the start, but by December, the full force of such a trend will be seen when elections are held in which all members of Iraqi society — men, women, Sunni, Shia, whatever — participate. Even as violence escalates in the country as the October referendum nears, the media is reporting that and only that. They were content to chastise the supposed failure of negotiating a liberal constitution even before the negotiations were over, and have since failed to do a follow-up showing just how promising the developing political situation amongst the various sectors of civil society is.

With the trial of the 15 Andijon “terrorists” still ongoing, the West has decided that it isn’t interested in ongoing diplomatic talks with Karimov over the massacre. It’s more interested in isolating the regime. At the meeting of the OSCE, the U.S. fully condemned the Uzbek government for the actions that it took.

Uzbekistan????????s disregard for its OSCE commitments is undermining its security, the United States believes. The systemic failure to observe these basic rights has exacerbated circumstances in Uzbekistan and, we believe, is a radicalizing factor, Finley said.

The United States, European Union, United Nations and OSCE have called for an independent, international investigation into the facts surrounding the Andijon massacre.

By using the war on terror as an excuse to crackdown on all political opposition, as Finley correctly notes, the Uzbek government is just creating more of an incentive for the general population to radicalize. Killing literally hundreds and hundreds of people for protesting against the government is no way to stop whatever Islamic militants might be in the country. So far, as the Bush administration says, “Karimov fears democracy more than terrorism.”

Seriously, who is he trying to fool here? Nobody believes that Karimov seriously supports the war on terror, so he isn’t even useful as a short-term ally. And, long-term, his internal repression will only make the population turn to extremism, which means the region can only become more volatile. It is therefore in the West’s long-term interests to isolate the current government and boost as much as possible any pro-reform entities.

It looks like that’s what is about to happen. Even more than the U.S. criticism, the Europe will be imposing sactions on the Uzbek government because of the Andijon massacre.

29 September 2005 — Reports from Brussels say the European Union will impose sanctions on Uzbekistan — including visa bans and an arms embargo — for Tashkent’s refusal to allow an international probe into the violence that took place in Andijon in May.

The sanctions are due to be announced on 3 October during a meeting of EU foreign ministers.

Western news agencies cite the draft document as criticizing what it calls “the excessive, disproportionate, and indiscriminate use of force by the Uzbek security forces.”

The draft says the European Council has decided to impose an embargo on exports to Uzbekistan of arms, military equipment, and other equipment that might be used for “internal repression.”

Other measures include cuts to EU aid programs, and a renewed call on EU states to highlight the need for respect of human rights in all bilateral dealings with Tashkent.

The Foreign Ministry in Tashkent had no immediate comment.

I think it’s likely that the U.S. will soon follow suit with sanctions of its own. Of course, there is the new Central Asia Democracy Act, which requires the administration to reduce aid and cooperation with the Uzbek government in light of no progress on human rights issues, but something more immediate has not yet happened. But I think with the high-pitched criticism, something will happen soon, and should.

The reason I put “really?” in the title of this post is because for all of the isolation maneuvers the West is making, Uzbekistan remains open to another part of the world. Russia and China have backed up Karimov completely, reasserting the claim that Islamic terrorists were the organizers of the Andijon uprising, and that they sought the violent overthrow of the government. Of course, that’s completely false, but it has the effect of propping up the regime. Sure, Karimov is becoming isolated from the west, but that doesn’t mean complete isolation, which means that Russia and China are making it infinitely harder to put pressure for reform on Uzbekistan.

Now, all hope isn’t lost. If we remember correctly, Russia was exerting massive influence over countries like Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. But pro-reform opposition was eventually able to mount to the point where external aid to the respective governments simply didn’t work. Hopefully that will be the case, even though Uzbekistan is notably more repressive on all counts than those countries. It will certainly be more difficult.

Nathan has a really good idea for the opposition. Given that Karimov is definitely more interested in saving his own power by putting down political opposition than fighting any real terrorists, and it’s becoming ever more apparent even to many inside Uzbekistan, “Pro-reform and genuinely interested in counterterrorism for counterterrorism????????s and regional security????????s sake (as opposed to the sake of one????????s own behind) is a pretty nice alternative to say the least. ”

As I said earlier, the moves that Karimov is making are actually hurting national and regional security by radicalizing people. Since an authoritarian govenrment like Karimov’s tries to make people believe that it is the end-all solution to everything, especially security, making people realize that the government isn’t serving the people’s interest and is even failing on this ground would really bolster the opposition and provide an opportunity to create a wedge in the government’s power.

From the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on Feb. 14 to the almost successful assassination attempt on journalist May Chidiac this past Sunday, there have now been 13 attacks in Lebanon which have appeared to target Lebanese opponents of Syrian domination (Reuters: Lebanon Seeks Help on Security). The main consequences have been massive protests which have forced the Syrian military to end its three-decade occupation of Lebanon and the establishment of an independent UN commission to investigate Hariri’s assassination, led by German prosecutor Detlev Mehlis, which is now turning up evidence implicating high-ranking Lebanese officials with links to Syria. His report is due Oct. 25. Now the gruesome attack of this past week deprived an attractive and popular journalist of a leg and an arm, and the outrage in the Arab world is growing. This post will examine the current status of the investigation, and what it could mean for the future of democratic Lebanon and the Assad regime in Damascus. It will also examine how the issue is playing out in the Arab media.

(Links to Arab newspapers are in Arabic unless otherwise indicated. Citations without links are due to the newspaper removing the articles from its website after I printed a copy but before copying the link.)

Syria Feeling the Heat
It should be noted at the outset the extreme danger this investigation poses for the Syrian government and its ruler, Bashar Assad. Hariri was not merely a former official turned opposition leader, but a Sunni Muslim with deep ties in Saudi Arabia, a close friend of French President Jacques Chirac, and a billionaire businessman reformer credited with rebuilding war-ravaged Lebanon in the 1990s. As Raghida Dergham wrote in Al-Hayat, Iran Receives Iraq as a “Gift” (English):

In private sessions, Arab leaders avoided pre-judging the investigation, either in its Lebanese or Syrian components. However, they are completely clear that there would be no Arab “cover” for anyone whose involvement in the Hariri assassination is proved by Mehlis. If the investigation issues charges against a person, security body or political regime, no Arab or Muslim leader with be able to challenge this - he will have to announce his support for the trial of anyone suspected of committing the crime…

During the course of its presence in Lebanon, Syria has not merely maintained a military presence but developed an extensive web of agents and other clients within the Lebanese political and security establishment allowing it to maintain control over the country while retaining a semblance of Lebanese sovereignty. A Sept. 9 report by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy describes the course of the investigation so far and its potential impact on the Syrian government:

…Meanwhile, the assassination polarized Lebanon and triggered a grassroots national movement that compelled Syria to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1559 and withdraw from Lebanon after almost three decades of occupation. At the same time, the opposition in Lebanon called for the resignation of the seven most important pro-Syrian security chiefs and officials. Six of the seven resigned, including the head of the General Security Department, Brig. Gen. Jamil Sayyed; the chief of the Internal Security Forces, Maj. Gen. Ali Hajj; and the head of military intelligence, Brig. Gen. Raymond Azar. The only one who remained in office was the commander of the army’s Presidential Brigade, Brig. Gen. Mustafa Hamdan.

On April 7, the UN Security Council acted on the factfinding mission’s recommendation and passed Security Council Resolution 1595, authorizing an independent commission to investigate the assassination. Annan appointed German prosecutor Detlev Mehlis to head the commission. Following several months of extensive interviews and forensic work, Mehlis surprised the political establishments in Lebanon and Syria by naming former pro-Syrian security chiefs and officials suspects in the assassination. On September 1, Lebanese authorities rounded up nine pro-Syrian officials for interrogation by the Mehlis Commission. Prominent among them were Sayyed, Hajj, Azar, and Hamdan. In a press conference the following day, Mehlis announced that the investigation had made significant progress on several fronts. When asked about the implication of the security chiefs in the assassination, he answered, “They participated to some extent in the planning that led to the assassination of Hariri.” On September 3, the Lebanese investigating magistrate Elias Eid issued arrest warrants charging the four security chiefs with murder, attempted murder, terrorism, and illegal possession of weapons and explosives…

Mehlis had earlier said that he is not satisfied with the level of Syrian cooperation in his investigation. In particular, he has been disappointed in his commission’s access to Syrian security officials who were posted in Lebanon. In a dramatic reversal, Syrian authorities have invited Mehlis to Damascus on September 10. Mehlis has gone some way to assuage Syrian concerns by saying that he wants to interview some Syrian officials as witnesses and not as suspects. It is not clear if Syria will allow access to all of the relevant people. One of the most significant figures — Brig. Gen. Rustum Ghazaleh, former chief of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon — recently retired, making him a potential fall guy. Other important officials include chief of Syrian intelligence in Beirut, Muhammad Khallouf, and the officers in charge of intelligence posts in Akkar (Nabil Hishmeh), Tripoli (Khalil Zogheib), Dahieh (Jameh Jameh), and Zahle (Abu Michel)…

The British newspaper The Guardian provides further details regarding evidence uncovered more recently (via Syria-Comment):

…According to a source close to the investigation, evidence pointing to Syrian involvement in the murder has grown - in particular, from a Syrian defector, who claims he was in the room when Hariri’s assassination was discussed. “The defector is singing,” the source said.

Evidence recovered by a team of six British divers off the Beirut coast, where Hariri’s motorcade was blown apart, had also played an important part in the inquiry, the source added. The scene of the explosion was quickly covered over after the murder and much evidence lost, but the divers recovered human remains and car and truck parts from the seafloor…

This week Mr Mehlis visited Damascus where, according to a diplomatic source in Beirut, he interviewed Rustom Ghazali, Syria’s former intelligence chief in Lebanon, and Walid al-Mouallem, the deputy foreign minister, who has been given responsibility for Lebanese affairs since Hariri’s death.

A team of four investigators has been sent to Damascus to interview Asef Shawkat, the head of military intelligence and Mr Assad’s brother-in-law, and nine other Syrian officials. All those being interviewed were, at this stage, classified as “witnesses”, the diplomatic source said. Mr Mehlis would decide who, if any, should be reclassified from “witness” to “suspect”, he added…

Last week Lebanon’s central bank agreed to waive strict secrecy laws to allow the investigators to examine the bank accounts of senior Syrian security officers, including Mr Ghazali and the interior minister, Ghazi Kanaan, who was Syria’s intelligence chief in Lebanon before Mr Ghazali. Bank accounts used by the men’s wives and families will also be inspected. The Syrian regime is known to have siphoned millions of pounds from the Lebanese economy during their years of occupation following the civil war.

The heat is on indeed.

Arab Reactions
Randa Naqi al-Din, writing in Al-Hayat, seemed to express the main sentiment in tying the attack on Chidiac to previous assassinations, in an article titled May Chidiac and ‘Our River of Hell‘:

The hideous crime which sought to kill our friend May Chidiac, comes within the framework of cowardly plans to shut down the free press and cover up the truth and the popular will. The program ‘Your Happy River’ which Shidyak produced was always trying to make up for the lack of real dialogue and lively exchange of opinion in a true democratic way. And along with ‘Your Happy River’ last Sunday to ‘The River of Hell’ of May there was also our friend Samir Qasir who gave his life, and the former general secretary of the Socialist Party George Hawi, both of which followed the explosion which killed the martyr president Rafiq Hariri and representative Basil Falhan and their associates…

And so our prayer today for May Chidiac is that the strength of her voice recover and return, but it is also important that we discover who wanted to kill her and who wanted to assassinate Samir Qasir and George Hawi. The truth will be shown in regard to the killing of the martyr president Rafiq Hariri, because Mehlis is determined to show it. But as to the other crimes we must also discover the truth of them for the sake of all the sons of Lebanon.

Also in Al-Hayat (”So That the Killer Does Not Smile,” Sept. 27), Ghassan Sharbil wrote regarding Chidiac’s work: “Our friend May Chidiac accomplished that which justified the decision to condemn her. She was a journalist of independence and honesty of our time without parallel. Her questions were direct in an environment which required concealment. She went far in dialogue and conversation like she disdained any red lines. She crept in the morning into houses near and afar. And the most dangerous thing about her was her practice of going to the witness and maintaining the confidence of those who both agreed with her and those who did not.”

Not all have been content to merely condemn the attack and imply who might be guilty. As Al-Sharq al-Awsat reports, Lebanese Communications Minister Marwan Hamada has explicitly blamed Syria and Lebanon’s pro-Syrian president Emil Lahoud for the attempted assassination (see “Hamada Accuses Syria, the Intelligence Services and Lahoud…the Interior Minister Declares that Lebanon Faces the Specter of Terrorism,” Sept. 27).

As also noted in the Reuters article linked above, Lebanese Defense Minister Elias al-Murr, who survived an attempt on his own life in July, is quoted in Al-Hayat (see Mehlis Leaves Tomorrow While Authorizing Assistants in Damascus to Work Further and the Security Council Excepcts a Lebanese Request for Aid… Investigators to Meet with al-Murr and a Witness in the Chidiac Attempted Assassination Focusing on the Distortion of Evidence which Preceded the Assassination of Hariri) and Al-Quds (see The Attempted Assassination of May Chidiac…Who Did it and Why?) as pointing the finger at Syria. It says a lot that the defense minister of a country spends most of his time outside of it because he doesn’t trust its pro-Syrian security chiefs to protect him. Perhaps this will change with the recent arrests. The headline of the Al-Hayat article refers to the discovery of evidence regarding previously covered up communications which took place prior to the Hariri killing and which continued for more than two hours following, and the fact that al-Murr must be questioned in Switzerland. The article also notes that although investigating the Chidiac attempt is beyond Mehlis’ jurisdiction, his team will be looking at that too, suggesting that there was a witness whose testimony might bear on the Hariri matter.

With the pressure mounting, there are indications that Bashar Assad has sought to gain protection by reaching a deal similar to that Muamar Qaddafi reached with the United States in which he escaped liability for past terrorism by coming clean, giving up his nuclear program, and compensating the victims. But according to this Washington Post article, at least, it seems that neither the U.S. nor France is interested in any bargain. Both seem to have decided that this investigation could fatally cripple Assad’s regime, and they are glad to see it happen. Al-Hayat has also reported similarly (see the Sept. 27 article, “French Warning of a ‘Difficult’ Lebanese Phase and the Willingness of America to Help in the Investigation…A Joint Declaration by Hariri and Jaja Condemns the Crime…The Attempt to Assassinate Chidiac Opens the Security Issue and Siniora’s Government Seeks to Strengthen Security”). The article discusses the increasing pressures on the prime minister from all factions opposed to Syria to take decisive action to prevent any more acts of violence against that country’s critics.

Conclusion
I suspect that the evidence trail will stop somewhere short of the feet of Bashar Assad, but nevertheless the fact that it is gone this far would have been unthinkable in the Arab world just a few years ago. Multiple factors, including regime change and democratic blossoming in Iraq, the death of Yasser Arafat, the climbdown of Libya’s Muamar Qaddafi, and particularly here the popular revolution in Lebanon have changed the world in which Arab tyrants live. Seeing the fate of Arab generals decided by a German lawyer may be more chilling than that of Saddam climbing out of that spider hole. As Dergham notes, Iran is ascendant as the West is paralyzed with indecision in the face of its nuclear ambitions, yet Baathist Syria has never been more isolated. Even if Assad himself is not implicated, the Mehlis investigation is already touching key members of the factions which have real control of the unstable tyranny over which he presides. Bashar himself will not likely be strong enough to hold it together if they go.

Contributed by Kirk H. Sowell, Arab World Analysis.com

The Kyrgyz parliament voted on President Bakiyev’s picks for cabinet positions. But it looks like more than a few people were surprised when it decided to reject a nice handful of them, including acting foreign minister Roza Otunbaeva.

27 September 2005 (RFE/RL) — Kyrgyzstan’s parliament today debated President Kurmanbek Bakiev’s cabinet nominations, approving some but rejecting others.

The most notable rejection was Roza Otunbaeva to be foreign minister. Otunbaeva served in that post for a time in the 1990s when Askar Akaev was president.

Five other nominees were rejected, among them Ishenbai Kadyrbekov, nominated to be minister of transportation and communications.

Prime Minister Feliks Kulov said he was surprised by the outcome, but told reporters that new candidates for vacant posts will be nominated shortly.

Ten nominees were confirmed by parliament.

As much as I enjoy reading Roza’s rhetoric, I can’t say that I’m surprised to see the parliament reject some of the proposed ministers. I don’t think it’s because they particularly dislike Roza, though she did serve under Akayev, but I think they’re trying to assert their independence from the executive branch.

This comes amid talks over proposed changes to the constitution. One of those changes will be giving the power of cabinet appointments to the parliament instead of the president. It looks like they’re ready to assert that desire. The surprise shown by Feliks Kulov can be summed up in that he opposes that specific change to the constitution. However, a more powerful parliament is necessary for the development of democracy in Kyrgyzstan, as certain presidential systems have shown to be disastrous thusfar.

With the announcement of a new set of cabinet ministers, the Ukrainian government is getting back to normal. Economic projections are starting to be hopeful about the future, at least in the short term, and in the very least it means some stability for awhile. But politics in Ukraine is far from normal right now.

The split between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko has effectively left a lot of Ukrainian voters disillusioned with the former and cautious about the latter. Yushchenko signed a deal with arch-rival Yanukovich in order to get Yekhanurov approved as the prime minister, while Tymoshenko went to Russia for the first time. She has also sworn to take her message to the farthest reaches of Ukraine, meaning the more Russian east. Russia may in fact be the biggest gainer out of all this, and even if not, that’s how many Ukrainians are perceiving it.

As the Yushchenko and Tymoshenko teams bitterly split following the government dismissal, both had apparently sent messages to Moscow that may eventually produce a greater-than-expected cooperation between the two biggest states of the former Soviet Union.

Yushchenko appointed Yuriy Yekhanurov, a Russia-born ally of the president, to the post of prime minister. This is a contrast to Tymoshenko, who has been using populist anti-Russian rhetoric, such as pushing for the building of a natural gas pipeline bypassing Russia, and irritating Moscow for the past seven months. To push Yekhanurov through Parliament, Yushchenko struck an unprecedented agreement with Yanukovych, the Russian favorite, whose party had overwhelmingly backed the choice.

But the latest development in Ukraine????????s political reshuffling appears to be even more surprising than anything. Tymoshenko traveled to Moscow on Sept. 24 apparently for a secret meeting with Kremlin strategists to outline her vision of a future cooperation.

The Russian authorities appeared to be so pleased with Tymoshenko’s turnaround that they had immediately cancelled an international arrest warrant for her. Several Kremlin-controlled media outlets have followed with a favorable coverage of Tymoshenko in broadcasts that are widely viewed in Ukraine.

So, 10 months after Russia’s fiasco at the presidential election in Ukraine, Moscow now appears to have much closer cooperation with all three major political groups that are expected to score well as the upcoming election in March 2006. The winner will become prime minister, a job that will have extended powers to shape the country’s policy with amendments to the constitution coming into force on Jan. 1, 2006.

No matter who wins the election, Yekhanurov, Tymoshenko or Yanukovych, Russia seems to have already secured a favorable outcome.

It’s basically an all out drive for votes. Some might say that it’s politics as usual, but for those who risked their lives to go out to Maidan, they are wondering what happened to the promises both of these leaders made to the country. The drive to weed out corruption basically came to a standstill as the ministers fought with each other, and the appointment of Yekhanurov along with the Yushchenko-Yanukovich deal signals a shift toward government that doesn’t want to shake things up. At the same time, Tymoshenko was always a populist but now continues to fly off the deep end rhetorically. The desire for power from all sides seems all the more apparent now.

There’s an interesting article in today’s issue of Eurasia Daily Monitor entitled, “Is Pora turning against Yushchenko?” Although PORA never officially endorsed Yushchenko — it was only officially brought people out to protest against phony elections — it is definitely having its reservations about the capabilities and even the desire of the new government to bring about change. Also, it looks like Yushchenko’s poll numbers are dropping from a Ukrainian all-time high to a really bad low, while Tymoshenko and the PORA party are doing significantly well now. In essence, PORA, once considered having no chance in the real political arena, is once again making its case against government corruption. Here’s a bit from the end:

Pora, the non-governmental organization that played a decisive role in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, has adopted a highly critical stance towards the ten-point memorandum signed last week by President Viktor Yushchenko and the leader of the Party of Regions, former prime minister Viktor Yanukovych (see EDM, September 23; pora.org.ua, September 27).

The memos from both wings of Pora seek to draw attention to the Yushchenko administration’s lack of progress toward implementing what they believe were the ideals of the Orange Revolution. Pora’s memorandum blamed the political crisis on the authorities and the economic crisis on the government. “Ukrainian citizens went to the Maidan not for Yushchenko or for Tymoshenko, but for a normal way of life and moral authorities” (pora.org.ua, September 27).

Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko, a Socialist, agreed, saying, “The Maidan stood not for Tymoshenko or even not completely for Yushchenko. People stood for liberty and against ÄelectionÅ falsification” (Ukrayinska pravda, September 26). This demand led to an unusual alliance of “socialists, nationalists, democrats, anarchists” and people of different religious confessions.

Yushchenko may come to regret signing the memorandum with Yanukovych. Serhiy Rakhmanin, a prominent commentator on Zerkalo Tyzhnia/Nedeli (September 24-30) confessed, “I pity this person ÄYushchenkoÅ. He has no place in my own Maidan.”

Yushchenko’s popularity has declined from 33% in August to only 20% today (Zerkalo Tyzhnia/Nedeli, September 24-30). The latest poll shows that Peoples Union-Our Ukraine has collapsed in support to only 13.9%, while the Tymoshenko bloc has grown to 20.5% (Ukrayinska pravda, September 28).

The outcome of the crisis suggests that Yushchenko will face a serious challenge from both Pora and Tymoshenko in the 2006 elections.

Whatever happens, it looks like the political stalemate following the Orange Revolution has put a big dent in Yushchenko’s credibility as someone who can change the country. Tymoshenko has always been the revolutionary, but perhaps too much so, as she makes business nervous and people unsure of what she’ll do to get power. As for PORA, I’ve never been keen on seeing them as a political party due to their independent nature from government, but it will be interesting to see if they get more powerful, and how they will use it.

Confirming strongly our theory that the babes go where the heart of the action is. At the Iraq war counterrallies this weekend to defend Iraqi freedom and stand up for U.S. troops, there are some spectacular examples. Go see it here.

Hey everyone,

Corresponding with SGD’s official press release below, I will be organizing a Walk For Democracy here in Boston, Massachusetts on Saturday the 15th of October. I urge anyone who is able to attend to email me: robertmayerÉgmail.com

The donation will be $15 minimum, which will get you a t-shirt to wear with the other demonstrators. You can use the button below to donate, which will then be transferred on to SGD. You do not have to attend the march to donate, however, and you don’t have to donate just $15. If you would like to contribute to a good cause, freedom and democracy for the people of Belarus certainly is one. You can even use a credit card.

Of course, you don’t have to donate in order to join in. If you’d like to show up but don’t have the money, that’s alright. The more people the better. It’s just that the more money we raise, the more money we can give directly to the opposition in Belarus.

This is great. Gateway Pundit has the roundup. And the left fades into oblivion…

Over the weekend, the Azeri opposition staged a rally that was unsanctioned by the government. The consequences for doing so were disastrous, with the police arresting up to 100 activists in one fell swoop, beating with batons dozens more. With elections coming up in just over a month, it goes to show how a government afraid for its own existence is beginning to take a hard line against the opposition.

Police in the former Soviet Azerbaijan republic have beaten and arrested dozens of protesters during a rally in the capital, Baku. Opposition parties held the rally despite a warning from Interior Minister Ramil Usubov who said police would break up the protest, The Associated Press reported.

Opposition supporters defied the authorities and tried to hold the demonstration ahead of parliamentary elections set for November. Thousands of supporters from the Caspian Sea nation????????s largest opposition, Azadlig, marched through Baku.

The Interior Ministry said the rally was not sanctioned and protesters had been warned that force would be used. Police in riot gear blocked off the roads leading to Baku????????s main square where thousands of demonstrators had planned to meet.

All across the city centre, groups of protesters tried to make their way through the police cordons. On one of the streets, they raised their hands to prove that they were not armed. Many held flowers to show their protest was peaceful, the BBC reported.

But as soon as they began to chant anti-government slogans, the police moved forward. They chased the demonstrators down the streets, beating them with batons.

The chief of Baku police, addressing media after the event, denied reports of injuries and said the organizers had been warned well in advance not to proceed with the unsanctioned rally.

Opposition leaders say they are trying to negotiate the release of the arrested activists.

The demonstrations have become almost weekly affairs, with the opposition demanding that President Ilham Aliev resign and that the Nov. 6 elections be free and fair.

The mounting tensions has led some observers to predict the oil-rich country could see a popular uprising similar to those that have taken place in the other former Soviet republics of Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.

I’ve said several times before that I think Azerbaijan is the most likely post-Soviet country to undergo another colored revolution. Earlier in the year, opposition rallies weren’t allowed to register and garnered at most a few hundred supporters. Now, due to international pressure, the government has been allowing sanctioned rallies — which has ballooned the number of demonstrators up to the tens of thousands. In sum, the opposition movement, even though its platform and means of achieving democracy are relatively undecided upon, is gaining steam in the country.

However, the United States is not necessarily pushing for revolution there. They are pushing for a more “evolutionary” democracy as opposed to the revolutionary scenario that took place in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. The 2003 riots proved to be violent, and they’re afraid that the kind of mass unrest with such a barely united-out-of-convenience opposition movement would lead to an even worse political situation than exists right now. That is, no consensus would emerge on who to lead the country.

It also can’t be assumed that this is simply a government vs. opposition issue. Not everyone in the government is as hardline as the security and defense heads. What the strategy of “evolutionary democracy” means is getting enough of the opposition into parliament in the upcoming election so that they can work with the more reform-minded of the Aliyev government, thus outnumbering the hardliners.

That’s why the main emphasis this election season has been on free and fair elections, and not necessarily an outright victory for the opposition. The fact is, the opposition doesn’t much know how to govern, as they don’t really have a platform or even a clue about how to do so. Chances are, Aliyev still has enough popularity that he’d win anyway. However, if the vote is free and fair, the opposition really would win enough seats to be able to slowly move the country in the right direction. If this indeed is the outcome, it would certainly be preferable to all out revolution.

Via WILLisms, and Stefania, I just spotted this week’s Carnival of Revolutions, very nicely done this week by Ken McCracken, and full of good stuff. Read it here.

This is just what we were looking for - of all people, my boss at work discovered it and sent it to me. Just what we wanted to see, a free-market Brazilian blog written by a smart Brazilian that tells us the deal about what’s going on in Brazil. I’m really excited!

The blog, called ‘Swimming Against The Red Tide’ written by Luis Alfonso Assumpcao, in Porto Alegre (!), Brazil, hits home runs!!!! I guess he saw the leftist hippies up close and wanted to say something. His blogroll links to sterling free-market other blogs we are great fans of.

Read it here.

The trial of the 15 Andijon “terrorists” is underway, and the results are all too predictable. The defendants are admitting complete guilt, straight down the government line. Nathan is rounding up all the coverage of the trials, and describes it as, “a parade of confessions confirming every last detail of the Uzbek government????????s paranoid fantasies.” RFE/RL digs down deep into what this all means, saying that it is just the continuation of years of well-established pattern. It’s really something completely out of 1984, a compelling article to say the least, though it shouldn’t come as any surprise.

Prague, 21 September 2005 (RFE/RL) — The terrorism trial that opened in Tashkent yesterday is the first of several in connection with last May’s violence in the eastern Uzbek city of Andijon. More than 100 people are still being held awaiting their trial date.

Terrorism trials in Uzbekistan have followed a regular pattern since the first such trials started in 1999 after bombings in Tashkent. They include trials related to the incursions by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in 1999 and 2000, and the attacks in Bukhara and Tashkent in 2004.”In these serious terrorism trials you also often find that the lawyers for the defendants insist upon their clients guilt, or simply go throughout the entire process silent rather than launching any kind of robust defense for their clients.”

One person who has attended many of the trials is Acacia Shields, the senior researcher on Central Asia for the New York-based organization Human Rights Watch. She said yesterday’s proceedings followed a standard format.

“This is really the launching event for not only a series of show trials, but the entire Uzbek government propaganda campaign which is an effort by the Uzbek government to rewrite the events that took place in Andijon in May,” she said.

Make sure to read the rest of the article. It notes that the confessions — obviously given after coercion and torture — line up with exactly what the Uzbek government has been saying. Everything from insane plots to terrorist training in Kyrgyzstan. And, of course, that’s all bull.

The U.S. government, after being served its eviction notice for the airbase when it started criticizing Karimov, is sending a team to confront Karimov about a range of issues. It seems timed specifically to coincide with the beginning of these trials.

Amid new tensions with a key ally in the war on terrorism, the Bush administration is dispatching a high-level team to Uzbekistan tomorrow to lay out concerns on an array of political and regional security issues. The team, which will include senior officials from the State Department, Pentagon and National Security Council, is scheduled to meet President Islam Karimov on Tuesday, U.S. officials said.

One of the officials said the delegation plans to express ???????grave concern??????? about human rights violations. ???????This is a difficult trip, but someone has to talk to the man,??????? the official said.

Beside what happened in Andijon, I’m sure that the delegation will discuss the huge political rivalry that’s developed between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in light of the refugees taken in from the massacre. Having recently undergone revolution and established what seems to be a fairly better government, the U.S. is working to make sure that it has the most stable atmosphere to develop, while isolating the Uzbek government. The problem there is that Russia and China have more influence in the region than the United States and have been actively working to halt the west’s own influence there.

The United States government could be readying up a drive to deal with Burma, one of the six main “outposts of tyranny” with one of the most repressive regimes in the world. To do this, it will be pushing for a referral to the United Nations Security Council, where at best we will be able to find out where all of the world’s major players stand on the issue.

Sep 22, 2005 (DVB) - US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Eric G. John told a congressional committee that Washington intended to push for United Nations Security Council discussion of Burma, which remains exceptionally repressive and is becoming even harsher in its treatment of its people.

He also urged the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and neighbouring countries to do more for reform in Burma, adding the engagement approach by China and Thailand was unproductive.

His comments followed a joint report by Czech President Vaclav Havel and South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu which calls for immediate action on the deterioration situation of Burma by the UN Security Council and the international community.

Most of the real action being taken is at ASEAN, which held it’s summit in July. One of the most controversial issues was the rotating chairmanship that Burma was going to head in 2006. But after a lot of concerns and pressure from the more politically open ASEAN countries, the junta had to forgo the position.

The article above mentions the difference in policy between U.S. policy and the more democratic countries with that of China. If I remember correctly, there were two diplomatic snubs made during the ASEAN summit, and they happened to be from these two countries.

First, there was that of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who failed to attend. It was the first time an American SoS hadn’t attended the ASEAN summit. Ever. It was a clear message that it’s members needed to be ready to isolate Burma’s military junta, thus forcing it to reform or get strangled.

The second was from China’s foreign minister, who visited Burma instead of the summit in a show of support for the engagement policy. What this really means is that China was willing to forgo taking a stand against one of the most flagrant abusers of human rights in the world — in exchange for all important trade arrangements.

On the other hand, the United States has passed legislation reaffirming a ban on imports from Burma, and the effects are already being felt. And the political sparring match continues.

We have learned that within days of the import ban legislation passed by the two houses of the United States Congress, many factories in Hlaingthaya of Rangoon Division have already closed down.

According to Rangoon residents, factory workers have been given salaries for three months and told to take their time off.
Ä…Å
Dr Thaung Htun : The main reason for our efforts to get sanctions imposed is to weaken the economic base of the SPDC ÄState Peace and Development CouncilÅ. In previous years, exports from Burma to the United States amounted to about 400m dollars, and the bulk of this amount goes into the coffers of the SPDC. By passing the legislation, we will be able to block this 400m dollars from going to the SPDC.

Also, the entire US Congress is in support of bringing the case of Burma before the UN Security Council. With regard to the economic sanctions against Burma, the US Congress wants to see the international community, particularly the UN Security Council, to cooperate and take effective action.

We have learned that the US representative to the United Nations took the lead in discussing Burma at the UN Security Council meeting on Thursday Ä16 JulyÅ. Britain and France also voiced their opinions in support of the United States.

Russia, however, said that the question of Burma was a matter that only concerned the UN General Assembly and had nothing to do with the UN Security Council.

What was remarkable, however, was that the Chinese representative, who most had thought would use his veto power, just sat there listening without making any comments.

China is carefully staking out its position on Burma with regards to its relations with the rest of the world; especially the free world. Burma may seem like a rather insignificant country for China to support relative perhaps to other economically important areas, but it remains a thorn in the side of the region’s democratic countries who want to progress and modernize.

By helping to maintain the military junta’s economic base when the rest of the world won’t, China gets the dual benefit of taking the country’s resources at bargain basement prices while preventing any kind of democratic domino that would work against its favor in that regard. It would also explain why China is harboring support for other regimes like Zimbabwe, at a time when securing resources is more critical to China’s future than ever. It might seem strange, but in a parody world as backward as that, despotism actually work’s in their favor.

That should worry the emerging democracies in the region, which is actually one of the reasons this is becoming an increasingly important issue for these countries. ASEAN member countries are becoming increasingly vocal, even moreso than during the July summit.

???????We cannot tolerate this any more,??????? outspoken Thai senator Kraisak Choonhavan - an old friend of detained Myanmar opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi - told a news conference. ???????We need our respective governments in Asia to do more.??????? Claiming some of the credit for the junta????????s decision to skip its turn as chairman of ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations) in 2006, the MPs said the international community should not ease the pressure on Yangon????????s generals. Teresa Kok, secretary of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus (AIPMC), said: ???????The AIPMC resolves to call for the suspension of Myanmar from ASEAN if it fails to bring democratic reforms in the country in the next 12 months.??????? ???????The deteriorating situation in Myanmar is affecting not only those within the country, but people outside its borders as well,??????? AIPMC said in a statement.

These countries have to worry about the problems of drug running, the sex trade, arms dealing, and a host of others that are epidemic to the region, but especially an oppressive Burma in particular. With a kind of hub for this activity existing there, it prevents everyone else from moving forward and dealing with other problems. The military junta’s existence continues due in part to China’s help, which adds the second dimension to this equation. China’s rising influence is highlighted by that support, and if I were the leader of a country in the region, I would be concerned about its priorities and how those priorities effect my country. These ASEAN countries are siding with the United States on this issue because it is the only country with enough influence in global affairs to push this issue in the face of China’s coming domination of Asia, and the need to escape as unscathed as possible that domination.

This is cool. Reporters Without Borders has published a broad and detailed booklet for bloggers and others who want to get out there opinion; especially people from countries where that isn’t necessarily easy to do. Check it out here.

Remember everyone, we here at Publius need a break, so there isn’t any posting on the weekends.

But since I’m awake and relatively bored, I’m going to take a cue from Nathan and ask all of you fine, fine readers to delurk. What that means for everyone who sees this is to simply post a comment here and let us know that you exist. Maybe even write something about yourself. Engage us!

Source: Babalu

The photographs will break your heart. Ten people from Cuba, where Hurricane Dennis hit this year, riding the worst piece of rusted junk you can see, inventively powered by a tractor motor and some strange orange sail, rode through HURRICANE RITA and its storm-tossed seas for a week in the Florida Strait determined by hope to reach life and freedom on U.S. shores.

Just as they were within sight of U.S. land, a Coast Guard cutter tried to ram their boat and sink them. The poor Cuban refugees were desperately resisting the Coast Guard (see the photos here), because the U.S. officials would take them not to freedom, but back to communism, where being returned, they would lose everything. Everything - their homes, their right to schooling, their jobs, their right to life. That’s what Fidel Castro does to people who try to leave his island paradise. He takes everything away from them. Like Mugabe.

The U.S. has a monstrous, inhuman, wetfoot-dryfoot policy that is creating untold human misery. How can anyone not hate the U.S. after an experience like that?

See the horrific pictures here and here.

Even though he missed approval by only three votes the other day, President Yushchenko’s pick for prime minister, Yuriy Yekhanurov, was easily approved by the parliament. But you’ll never guess who gave him the necessary votes. Dan McMinn has the count.

Ä1Å Communist Party faction (0 out of 56 votes of MPs),
Ä2Å Regions of Ukraine (50 out of 50), People’s Party (45 out of 47),
Ä3Å Our Ukraine People’s Union (44 out of 45),
Ä4Å Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc - (7 out of 41),
Ä5Å Socialist Party (25 out of 25),
Ä6Å Ukrainian People’s Party (23 out of 23),
Ä7Å Forward Ukraine! Party (20 out of 20),
Ä8Å Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) (0 out of 20),
Ä9Å Unified Ukraine (3 out of 16), Reforms and Order party (7 out of 15),
Ä10Å Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (15 out of 15),
Ä11Å Narodnyi Rukh of Ukraine (15 out of 15),
Ä12Å People’s Democratic Party and Labor Ukraine Party (13 out of 13)
Ä13Å 22 non-partisan MPs out of 28.

The Regions party, led by Yushchenko’s arch-foe and election rival Viktor Yanukovych. They signed a deal beforehand, which promised “no politicial persecution, freedom of speech, political reform begins Jan. 1, 2006 (according to Ihor Shkir); no reprivatization, amnesty to those election commission workers accused of violations during the 2004 election, adoption of the law on opposition and the law on the president (according to Vitaly Khomutynnyk).” (Thanks, Neeka!)

This doesn’t bode too well for reforms in the country, as least not until parliamentary elections in the spring. But not much was happening anyway, as the pre-revolution make up of the Rada hasn’t allowed much to happen (take the stalled WTO reforms, for example). Yekhanurov’s appointment is basically to fill in the huge gap left by the firing of the government, so that the country can be managed and stabilized effectively until the spring. So we’ll have to sit tight until then, but as the other week demonstrated, anything can happen.

Still, necessary as his approval was, it was a pretty tacky move on Yushchenko’s part signing a pact with Yanukovych. Makes you want to throw up a bit, which I’m sure is the feeling a lot of Orange-backers have in their stomachs. The Kiev Ukraine New Blog has a roundup of lots of commentary with regards to the cooperation.

Many people are saying that the revolution has been betrayed. I don’t think so, not quite anyway. If the constitutional reforms go into effect, parliament will be able to start its dirty work toward a better future once the elections are over, irregardless of whoever Yushchenko is on speaking terms with at the moment. It’s not that the revolution was necessarily betrayed, it’s just that the revolution is over. In the best of circumstances, the revolutionary spirit should have lasted until the spring, because now there is just going to be a big lull in public confidence. But whatever deals are being made don’t matter too much. The real democratic revolution will be in a few months, when power transfers hands without the need for street protests.

Months after disbanding the parliament and initializing a state of emergency, the king of Nepal has promised elections. This is the part where we all laugh and snicker.

Nepal’s royalist administration has repeated its commitment to restoring democracy in the country. But the announcement has been met with skepticism in Kathmandu.

Nepalese Foreign Minister Ramesh Nath Pandey has told the United Nations General Assembly that King Gyanendra’s commitment to multiparty democracy is “unflinching and total”. Mr. Pandey reiterated the King’s promise to hold municipal polls by April next year, and parliamentary elections within two years.

But the announcement brought little hope to Kathmandu, where political parties and civil activists have been stepping up pressure for the restoration of an elected government more quickly.

Yuvraj Ghimre, editor of Nepal’s “Samay” magazine, says political parties say that holding elections for local bodies will be a meaningless exercise.

“Political parties are not willing to believe in that because you hold municipal elections, but there is no government that is accountable to parliament, so there will be a contradiction: Who will these municipal bodies be accountable to? Also, the political parties are wanting more than just holding municipal elections, so there is still kind of stalemate,” he explained.

Remember, the reason the king said he disbanded the parliament was because of the Maoist insurgency — something he has yet to quell. The Maoists control significant portions of the country, so those areas are out of the question, and municipal elections in any case will be easy to rig. The thing is, Nepal already has a democratically elected parliament that has legitimacy with people. Chances are, given the lack of faith in the government right now, people won’t believe in whoever the newly ÄsÅelected leaders are. Adequate security and monitoring would be impossible.

Protests have been flaring ever since the king suspended parliament, but never before have they been so intense. They’ve been raging for the past couple of weeks especially, so much so that the king himself stayed away from the United Nations general assembly meeting, perhaps fearing that the government may be overthrown during his absence. The king doesn’t need to hold new elections just to put in a puppet parliament, he needs to reinstate the real one. Reinstating democracy isn’t as simple as holding elections, and certainly the king can’t be measured in good faith according by his actions, as he actively undermines the institutions already in place.

Alvaro Ruiz-Navajas has started a terrific new blog on Bolivia, with his first post loaded with intelligent insights. I look forward to seeing his thoughts as they come, going into the Bolivian election in December. Go see the excellent new blog here.

The magnificent writer and thinker, Alvaro Vargas Llosa, has a truly awesome, knock-your-sock-off essay today on the demise of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil, why it’s important, and why we should care. Brazil’s soft left revolution that so many have staked their hopes on has collapsed, leaving the hard Chavista left in place, a disturbing development for an entire continent.

He carefully explains the conditions that led to the huge cascading corruption scandal in Brazil and why it’s so bad. He also cites the controversial Brazilian writer, Olavo de Carvalho, as a source.

I’m so thrilled he’s writing about Brazil!

Alvaro Vargas Llosa’s insights are awesome, and I think even the most skeptical Brazilian reader will agree with them. Read it on Real Clear Politics here or on Alvaro’s own site (full of other good stuff) here.

Not through guerrillas this time but through pork-barrel-spending. Along with Hugo Chavez’s oil billions, Evo Morales has taken the lead in the Bolivian polls. Castro knows exactly why he’s doing this. Do we?

Read the whole thing here or here.

It’s on Real Clear Politics here.

Israel began its “disengagement” from the Gaza Strip five weeks ago, essentially removing all Jewish settlers within a week, although the withdrawal of the IDF from all Palestinian areas was not completed for a few weeks afterward. Prior to the withdrawal, there were some, including myself, who argued that withdrawing from Gaza without an agreement with the Palestinian Authority to disarm terrorist groups - especially Hamas - would lead to not only more attacks on Israel, but increased internecine Palestinian strife, possibly even the implosion of the PA itself, requiring a bloody reoccupation by the Israeli military. (If it helps to keep these things clear in your mind, click here for a map of the Gaza Strip in pdf format.)

This post takes a close look at how things are going in the early stages of what could be the beginning of a stable, democratic Palestinian state, or (I think more likely) a descent into chaos. A key point in this process was when Israel withdrew its forces from the so-called Philadelphi Corridor, the security area between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. When this happened, order immediately broke down, and both guns and drugs flowed across the border in significant quantities (more on this below). Direct challenges have been made to PA institutions led by President Mahmud Abbas, including the assassination of Mousa Arafat, a former security chief, the desecration of Jewish synagogues, and marches in which Hamas members openly paraded with their weapons.

Border of Insecurity
First, these are some highlights from a Washington Institute for Near East Policy report, A New Reality on the Egypt-Gaza Border (Part II): Contents of the New Israel-Egypt Agreement:

…When Israel decided to leave Gaza, the Israeli defense establishment argued against departure from the Philadelphi Corridor, the narrow stretch of land along Gaza????????s Egyptian border where Israel fought the smuggling of weapons into Gaza. The concern was over the militarization of Gaza; without Israeli soldiers guarding the border, it was feared that more and new weapons systems, including antiaircraft missiles and improved rockets, could escalate the danger to Israel. No other party, it was argued, can effectively substitute for Israel????????s motivation and capability in curbing smuggling.

Ultimately, other considerations prevailed. It was clear that with continued Israeli presence, the Philadelphi Corridor would perpetuate a major source of Israeli-Palestinian friction, destabilizing the postdisengagement situation and endangering the isolated Israeli forces left behind. But perhaps the weightiest consideration was the desire to be able to claim that Israel no longer bears responsibility for Gaza, which required a complete withdrawal of forces. Egypt appeared the best available substitute, since it bears formal responsibility and possesses the best tools to stem the flow of arms from its soil…

In the course of negotiations, Egyptian negotiators tried to frame the agreement as a first phase to the eventual deployment of several thousand Egyptian troops along the entire Israel-Egypt border south of the Gaza-Egypt border. That demand raised Israeli concerns????????and added fuel to a heated public debate over the agreement????????lest the Egyptians were to undo the demilitarization of Sinai as established by the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty. These concerns were met by defining the agreement as subject to the peace treaty and giving it the appearance of a procedural agreement between militaries. The Agreed Arrangements detail permitted Egyptian forces and equipment, keeping them light in nature; specify prohibitions on anything that may serve military purposes; and involve the existing Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai (MFO) as monitors of implementation. The agreement also grants Israel a veto over any further Egyptian deployment along the joint border. It should be noted that Cairo has always been careful not to fundamentally breach the military annex of the peace treaty…

What if Egypt fails to live up to its commitments under the agreement? After the Israeli departure on September 12, chaos erupted along the Egypt-Gaza border. Vast quantities of arms were smuggled into Gaza; on September 21 it is still not clear that the border has been effectively resealed, although both Egypt and the PA appear committed to sealing it. From the legal, political, and military points of view, it will be highly problematic for Israel to unilaterally abrogate the agreement with Egypt and return its forces to the Philadelphi Corridor. It is more likely that a porous border will result in a toughened Israeli stance regarding the opening and control of the other border crossings under discussion and making it harder for people and goods to enter Israel from Gaza. Here, the security concerns will be compounded by economic ones????????the collapse of the Israel-PA unified customs regime long applied along the PA????????s borders will require the establishment of a new independent Israeli customs regime along the Israel-Gaza border…

This security agreement, then, clearly impacts more than just the potential smuggling of weapons into Gaza to arm Palestinian militias. The agreement, in success or failure, will impact Israel’s broader security relationship with Egypt, as well as its economic relationship with the PA. See also Part I in the series, A New Reality on the Egypt-Gaza Border (Part I): Contents of the New Israel-Egypt Agreement which provides a more technical description of the details of the agreement, including its legal relationship to the peace treaty resulting from the Camp David Accords, composition of Egyptian forces, weapons allowed, conduct of airial and naval forces of both sides, and the role of the U.S.-led Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). Notably, the article emphasizes that in the case of any disagreement, “it will be resolved solely between Israel and Egypt, without referring to a third party.” That being a reference to the Palestinians.

The Palestinian Authority Crumbling
Shin Bet, Israel’s domestic security force, paints a bleak picture of Palestinian institutions, according to the Jerusalem Post, “PA is Crumbling, Fatah in Disarray“:

The Palestinian Authority is crumbling, its leader Mahmoud Abbas is too weak to enforce law and order, his Fatah party is in disarray and Hamas is taking control of the Gaza Strip, Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin said on Wednesday during a rare on-the-record briefing with military reporters…

“The Palestinian Authority is barely functional,” Diskin said at his headquarters in Ramat Aviv. “(Abbas) has no apparatus to control Fatah. He is a general without soldiers. Giving him more weapons won’t give Fatah strength. He needs more motivation.”

Preaching a message of doom and gloom for the prospects of a positive times ahead, Diskin said the Palestinians were making enormous efforts to acquire rockets and other weapons in the West Bank, smuggled in from the Sinai. He also said the Shin Bet believes Islamic extremists who follow an al-Qaida ideology were still targeting the Sinai resorts and that Israelis should stay out of there…

Diskin said that Hamas and other groups took advantage of the euphoric chaos after the IDF abandoned the Philadelphi corridor to smuggle in huge amounts of weapons and arms as well as return fugitives wanted for organizing terrorist attacks.

In one incident, a Hamas convoy of 15 jeeps crossed one day and returned laden with arms and explosives. According to Shin Bet data, 3,000 rifles, 1.5 million bullets, 150-200 rocket propelled grenades and hundreds of kilograms of explosives have been smuggled in so far.

But he said the Israeli Security Agency could not confirm reports that shoulder-fired Strella or Stinger missiles or advanced anti-tank rockets were also smuggled into the Gaza Strip…

References to the “Palestinian Authority” have always been misleading in a sense, because under Yasser Arafat as well, the PA did not constitute a unified administration but rather a fragmented and overlapping series of entities that Arafat kept separate to maintain power and patronage. The levers of power simply don’t seem to be there, because the society is so factionalized. So while Egyptian and Palestinian security services appear to now be making an attempt to stop the smuggling into Gaza, the situation is inherently unstable. For more links on this, see the Post’s Special Report: Gaza Upheaval.

Ahmad al-Rabei, writing for Al-Sharq al-Awsat, gave a similar diagnosis, but suggesting a way forward (see Settling the Security Situation in Gaza (English)):

…Arabs need to move fast in order to salvage the security situation in Gaza before it is too late, and for that to happen there needs to be an Arab support fund to help develop the Gaza strip. Such a development scheme would have to be made up of a joint fund provided by Arab Governments, civil society institutions and businessmen.

There are only two routes to take here. One would be for the Palestinians to develop a humane and civilized model that would put Israel on the spot, and with the help of international pressure force it to retreat from the rest of the occupied territories. With this option, Palestinians would be able to bring about an air of optimism, and in the process ensure a better future for the next generation. This would also strengthen the Palestinians of the western bank’s will and help accelerate Israeli withdrawal.

The other route that could be pursued is that of war, power plays, missile lunches against Israel, and a return to the mantra of “Martyrdom till the end”. Unfortunately this option has already started, with masked men with their weapons on display on the streets of Gaza. This could give out the impression to the world that the Gaza strip is an unsafe place to live in, and that no one should set foot in there let alone invest and nurture. It is almost as if some people cannot accommodate the notion of peace or the option of living.

If the Palestinian authority were to be left to deal with Gaza’s turbulent status solely, it would surely fail. What is required here is for an elaborate pan-Arab political, diplomatic and financial support particularly from influential parties, because the worst-case scenario is to abandon the Palestinian authority, and allow the insubordination situation to continue.

Abdul Rahman al-Rasheed, writing in the same periodical, has an op-ed (in English) actually titled An Impending Palestinian Civil War.

The Continued Rise of Hamas
A key issue coming up is the participation of Hamas in the PA’s legislative elections in January. Abbas postponed them in the summer, it was presumed, because he feared that Hamas would win. Israel began calling for Hamas to be banned from participating, but Abbas equivocated by refusing the request while repeating his toothless demand that Hamas disarm. Raghida Dragam, writing in Al-Hayat (Arabic), writes that the Quartet - the U.S., the EU, the UN and Russia - praised Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in a recent meeting while criticizing its settlements in Gaza, which have been both expanded and pulled back in different locations recently. The Quartet also emphasized that “armed action cannot be part of the electoral process.” It is probably worth noting in this connection, then, that it is all over the Arab media that Hamas might consider negotiating away its commitment to the destruction of Israel (see also this Reuters version in English). Analyzed closely, however, this is meaningless since (a) such negotiations are dependent on allowing the right of return of Palestinian refugees to Israel, leading to Israel’s destruction at the ballot box, and (b) they were in any case contradicted by recent statements by Hamas leaders in Gaza to the contrary - Hamas would never give up destroying Israel. Note especially this source cited by Eurabian Times which quotes Hamas leaders as saying that if they are excluded from Palestinian elections, they will simply set up their own government, and there will be parallel institutions.

This last issue of Hamas’ parallel institutions - which are already in existence to a large degree - would bring us to the point of a Palestinian civil war that so many of us have been predicting. Israel is now in a position of deciding just how bad things have to get before they step back in, leading to a major Israeli-Palestinian war (i.e. Do we wait until Hamas has taken over? Or intervene if it just looks like they might?). Hamas will have an incentive to keep things quite until January so as to consolidate their power, and if the PA breaks up into a series of armed gangs, Hamas could be the dominant power by early next year. Lastly, and sad to say, but the United States has basically abdicated any useful role here, supporting Sharon’s actions without question, continuing funding for the Palestinian Authority without accountability, and with Secretary of State Rice repeating meaningless statements about how wonderful the disengagement plan was, and how the PA just needs to disarm those terrorists in Hamas. Meanwhile, the power of the undisarmed Hamas continues to grow.

Contributed by Kirk H. Sowell of Arab World Analysis.com

Thousands of Congo’s displaced exiles are returning to their homeland in extreme hardship solely for the privilege of voting. Don’t anyone ever tell me they had the option to vote here in the states and just didn’t do it. Look at what these brave revolutionaries in Congo are doing.

The news item is here and Robert or I will put together a news and blogger roundup if there is any further information we can get:

Thousands of Congolese refugees are piling their furniture, bicycles, pots and pans onto barely seaworthy boats and heading back to their war-ravaged homeland, determined to vote in presidential elections.

I want peace, I want to vote and I want a good life for my children,” said Mukato Selemani after crossing Lake Tanganyika aboard a blue barge from Tanzania on Saturday, nine years after fleeing pillaging gunmen. “A real citizen will not miss the elections.”

Selemani, 29, does not even know if his village still exists.

But he joined the thousands of refugees making the journey back home in hopes of voting in the election next year ???????? their vast mineral-rich country’s first in nearly half a century.

Read the whole thing here.

Indonesia is at the boiling point with a whole string of frightening developments. Oil prices are going through the moon and the indonesian government, which subsidizes oil, is being crushed by those higher prices. That’s sent the miserable-anyway currency, the Indonesian rupiah, to its lowest levels in four years as capital flight takes off. Meanwhile, Bird Flu is prompting additional fears of an epidemic in Jakarta, one of the world’s most densely populated cities. There is even a row with China now that the Indonesian navy has fired on a Chinese fishing boat, killing a crewmember. They are in a world of trouble over in Indonesia. And Indonesia’s desperately poor people - poor because of past currency devaluations, I might add - are about to lose their oil subsidy, something they have rioted about in the past, toppling a dictator - and regardless of outcome, face terrible hardship.

Jakob Vawter has a short analysis here.

They’re so darn dumb. How does anyone get that dumb? Rule Number One: You DO NOT do drugs in Asia. Rule Number Two: You DO NOT transport drugs in Asia. Rule Number Three: You DO NOT associate with anyone who does drugs in Asia. Rule Number Four: You read the signs at airports, the ones in great big red letters that say ‘Drug Dealing Will Be Punished By Death’ and drop your drugs in that convenient trash receptacle right under that sign before you go see Mister Asian Customs Man. Rule Number Five: You do not violate any of this, ever.

One stupid Australian after another continues to prove Darwin’s Law that only the strongest and smartest of the species live to reproduce. After the melodrama of Schapelle Corby, dozens more Aussies have followed in her footsteps and gotten busted. Today, yet another one did, this one on Kalimantan.

AsiaPundit has found someone who understands the drill here:

How in the world do the police know to search your bag or purse? The answer is obvious. The police are the drug dealers in Bali. Or at least the drug dealers cooperate with the police to turn in their victims, collect the reward, and most likely enjoy the return of their drugs. This scam has been going on in Thailand for several decades, but now it enjoys official endorsement by the Indonesian government.

So even with this waiting for them, these fools go to Asia, see their peers get busted, bring drugs in anyway, and right off the lemmings cliff they go. Total schmucks. Total drug-dulled minds. Doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result. In Asia! These people belong in Asian jails. They just don’t learn otherwise. All I can say is, Australia will be a higher-IQ place without them.

Darwin, isn’t that a city in Australia?

Read Macam-Macam’s even more scornful account of these idiots here.